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In Douglas v. California' the United States Supreme Court
held, with three Justices dissenting, that the "denial of counsel
on appeal to an indigent would seem to be a discrimination at
least as invidious as that condemned in Griffin v. Illinois," where
the indigent defendant was denied a free transcript of the record
which was essential to his appeal. The significance of counsel
to assist with the appeal arises out of consideration of the appeal
as "an inseparable part of the process through which the in-
dividual's guilt or innocence of the charges brought against him
by the state is established." 2 The Douglas decision presented a
practical problem for the majority of states which, like Louisi-
ana, do not make provision for the furnishing of counsel to
assist an indigent defendant with his appeal. The difficulty of
formulating a statutory rule is illustrated by the fact that
Douglas held that "equal protection" was denied by a California
procedure under which the appellate court was to make a pre-
liminary investigation of the record and determine whether there
was any substantial basis for an appeal. The Supreme Court
gave no indication as to what means, if any, may be properly
adopted to protect the state from being required to appoint coun-
sel to represent the defendant in taking frivolous appeals.
Present Louisiana procedures include no specific statutory
provision concerning the right to counsel for appeals, but the
Louisiana Supreme Court stands ready to enforce the defend-
ant's right in a proper case. This is shown in State v. Graves,8
where Justice Summers, writing for a unanimous court, states,
"Upon the authority of Douglas v. California, at this time
we accept the proposition that an indigent accused is entitled to
appointed counsel on appeal in felony cases, unless he has waived
that right. Whatever considerations prompted our predecessors
to refuse court-appointed counsel on appeal in State v. Garcia4
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
2. See footnote to Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in People v. Brown,
55 Cal.2d 64, 69, 357 P.2d 1072, 1075 (1960).
3. 246 La. 460, 165 So. 2d 285 (1964).
4. 144 La. 435, 80 So. 648 (1919).
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must succumb to the authority of the Douglas case. In any event,
in most instances, court-appointed counsel in this State, though
there has been no specific statutory provision requiring them
to do so, have usually continued to represent the indigent de-
fendant on appeal - often at considerable personal expense and
sacrifice. The quality of the gentlemen of the bar in this State
has almost universally assured this right."5
It is important to note that the defendant's right to counsel,
whether it be in connection with the trial or for the appeal, must
be timely asserted. In Graves the Louisiana Supreme Court
stated, "We entertain no doubt that Graves intentionally and
completely waived counsel - not once, but at least twice. This
waiver was in writing on one occasion and in open court on
another occasion."6 The court found that the waiver of counsel
was intelligently made. The defendant's knowledge of the nature
of the appeal was evidenced by his request for a full transcript
of the proceedings. Under those circumstances the court con-
cluded that the early offer of court-appointed counsel had been
"deliberately rejected, we think, with the end in view of bring-
ing about the situation which now exists."' 7 Even if the delayed
request for counsel was not a dilatory stratagem, it would still
appear that the defendant should be bound by an intelligently
exercised choice to proceed without counsel.
CHANGE OF VENUE
Louisiana's change of venue rule, which is an implementation
of the defendant's basic right to be tried by an impartial tri-
bunal, provides that the venue shall be changed "to an adjoining
parish of the same judicial district, or to a parish of an adjoin-
ing district."'8 The constitutionality of this limitation was di-
rectly raised in State v. Rideau.9 The original murder conviction
had been reversed by the United States Supreme Court 10 on the
ground of prejudice resulting from the broadcast by a local
television station of an interview during which Rideau confessed
to the crime. The Supreme Court reasoned that due process of
law required a trial before a jury drawn from a community of
5. 246 La. 460, 467, 165 So. 2d 285, 288 (1964).
6. Ibid. The minutes of the court clearly show that the defendant had been
offered, and had refused counsel to represent him on appeal.
7. Id. at 469, 165 So. 2d at 289.
8. LA. R.S. 15:293 (1950).
9. 246 La. 451, 165 So. 2d 282 (1964).
10. Rideau v. Louisiana, .373 U.S. 723 (1963)
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people who had not seen and heard this televised interview. In
conformity with that decision, both the defense and the prosecu-
tion requested a change of venue "to some community outside of
the broadcast range" of the television station. In denying the
motion the trial judge pointed out that the change of venue
statute only authorized a transfer of the trial to an adjoining
parish of the same judicial district, or to a parish of an adjoin-
ing district, and that all of the parishes within this area were
also within the broadcast range of the television station. Thus,
in his opinion, every citizen living within these parishes was
automatically ineligible to sit as a juror and a judicial impasse
had been reached. This ruling, if followed to its ultimate con-
Clusion, would have placed Rideau beyond the authority of the
Louisiana courts.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, which has constitutional su-
pervisory jurisdiction over all inferior courts," could have exer-
cised that plenary authority in ordering the transfer of the case
to a more distant court where prospective jurors would not be
so directly influenced by the damaging television broadcast.
However, Chief Justice Fournet chose to posit his decision upon
a broader base, Which could serve as a guide for future trial
court change of venue decisions. In ordering the trial court to
grant a change of venue to a parish outside the range of the
television broadcasts objected to, the Chief Justice reasoned that
the purpose of the change of venue statute is to insure the right
of the accused to a speedy trial by an impartial jury in accord-
ance with the United States Constitution and the Louisiana
Constitution; "and when procedural legislation setting out the
rules governing such change conflicts with these basic constitu-
tional rights, to the extent the legislative enactments deprive
an accused of due process of law, then they must yield."'12 The
statute could not supersede our constitutional guarantee of "a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury."13
It is worthy of note that the Rideau problem would not come
up under the controlling change of venue article of the Louisiana
State Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure Projet, which
broadly authorizes the trial court to "transfer the case to another
parish."'14 (Emphasis added.)
11. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
12. 246 La. 451, 455, 165 :So. 2d 282, 284 (1964).
13. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
14. Proposed Code of Criminal Procedure art. 62.
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CHALLENGE OF JURY VENIRE- REQUIREMENT OF FRAUD OR
IRREPARABLE INJURY
Article 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is to be
continued in the new code,'5 "is a very important provision, for
it prevents frivolous attacks upon venires resulting from good
faith efforts by jury commissioners to comply wtih legal require-
ments for selecting juries."'16 This article is based upon a reali-
zation that jury commissioners are not trained legal technicians,
that certain failures to comply with the letter of the law are
expectable, and that such irregularities should not be a ground
for setting aside the jury venires they prepare "unless some
fraud has been practiced or some great wrong committed that
would work irreparable injury."' 7 The irregularity complained
of in State v. Clifton' as a ground for setting aside a murder
conviction was a harmless irregularity in the procedures fol-
lowed by the jury commission in the selection of the general
venire from which the grand jury and petit jury were drawn.
Article 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that
at the time of the meeting the jury commission shall select from
those qualified to serve a list of three hundred names to com-
pose the general venire. The appellant contended that the pro-
visions of the law were not followed in this case because the
members of the jury commission prepared lists in advance of the
meeting of people they would recommend for inclusion on the
general venire list. Each submitted his personal recommenda-
tions to the clerk of court who prepared a comprehensive master
list from them. At the meeting, the commission simply went
over the master list and made any changes they considered nec-
essary. The court looked to the spirit of the law and upheld the
actions of the commission because it felt there was "common
deliberation" by the commission in selecting the general venire.
The court concluded that although there had not been a full
literal compliance with article 179, the procedure followed was
a "substantial compliance" with the law:
"In any event the final selection in this case was actually
made by the body as a whole with the benefit of the ex-
15. LA. CODE CRiam. PRoc. art. 419 (1928).
16. Expos4 des Motifs for Title XI, Qualification and Selection of Grand
and Petit Jurors (1965) Comment (a), p. 35.
17. LA. R.S. 15:203 (1950).
18. 247 La. 495, 172 So. 2d 657 (1965). .
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perience of the individual commissioners and the informa-
tion they had previously compiled concerning persons they
considered qualified as jurors. The final list, then, was made
under their supervision after common deliberation regardless
of the plans and preparations which preceded the meeting."' 19
The Supreme Court's practical approach to the jury commis-
sion procedures in Clifton is another in a long list of cases where
the court has refused to invalidate jury commission procedures
which, while they failed to follow the exact procedures set forth,
had resulted in the preparation of the fair and qualified jury
list which the law contemplates.
PRESENT INSANITY HEARINGS
A 1964 statute, dealing with procedures to be followed where
a defendant has been committed to a mental institution because
of lack of capacity to stand trial,20 provides for a review of the
defendant's record at least once a year to determine whether he
is presently capable of standing trial. If the medical staff of
the mental institution concludes that a defendant is presently
capable of standing trial, this is reported to the committing
judge. However, the final determination of present trial capacity
is made by the committing court, and the 1964 statute expressly
provided that all releases from the mental institution must be
"upon the order of the court which committed the patient."'1
The recent case of State ex rel. Caesar v. Gremillion22 focuses
attention upon the significance of this provision. In 1956 Caesar,
charged with aggravated rape, was found to be presently in-
capable of standing trial, and was committed by the Orleans
Parish District Court to the East Louisiana State Mental Hos-
pital at Jackson. In 1963 the hospital authorities reported to
the committing court that Caesar presently had the mental ca-
pacity to proceed, but no action was taken by the Orleans Parish
officials. In 1964 a writ of habeas corpus was issued by the
judge of the Twentieth District Court, where Caesar was held
in the mental hospital. Pursuant to this writ, Caesar was re-
leased from the mental institution to the local sheriff, to be held
by him for the Orleans Parish authorities. A sanity hearing was
subsequently held by the Orleans Parish Court, which again
19. 172 So. 2d 657, 660 (1965).
"20. La. Acts 1964, No. 472, enacting a new IA. R.S. 15:271 (1964).
21. LA. R.S. 15:271C (1964).
22. 247 La. 1108, 176 So. 2d 394 (1965).
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found Caesar to be presently insane and incapable of assisting
with his defense; and ordered him recommitted to the state
mental hospital at Jackson. Three months after Caesar's re-
commitment the hospital authorities again reported to the com-
mitting court that he was presently capable of standing trial.
When no response was received to this communication, a second
petition for habeas corpus was received and granted, which
again ordered that Caesar be released from the mental institu-
tion and held by the local sheriff subject to further action by the
Orleans Parish authorities. The Louisiana Supreme Court re-
versed the release order, holding that the Twentieth District
Court was without jurisdiction in the matter. The reversal was
based largely upon the express statement of paragraph C of the
1964 statute that "no patient who has been committed to a
mental institution by court order pursuant to any civil or
criminal proceedings shall be released therefrom ... except upon
order of the court which committed the patient."
It is important that the committing court should hold a hear-
ing promptly upon receipt of a recommendation from the staff
of the mental institution that the defendant has present capacity
to stand trial. While the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
the defendant's right to a prompt hearing was not enforceable
by a writ of habeas corpus issued by the district court where he
was held, the Caesar decision did not result in a complete denial
of relief. The court ordered a prompt hearing as to Caesar's
present mental capacity by the committing court, and pointed
out that "in the event the judge finds him to be presently insane,
Caesar has a right of appeal to this court for review of the
ruling." 2
APPEAL - DISMISSAL WHERE DEFENDANT A FUGITIVE
Article 548 of the Code of Criminal Procedure24 provides that
if the appellant is a fugitive from justice on the return date or
the day fixed for hearing his appeal, the appeal will be dismissed.
Is this provision intended to penalize the defendant, by loss of
his appeal, where he escapes from the local jail pending the de-
termination of his appeal; or is it a rule to assure the availability
of the defendant on the day fixed for the hearing of his appeal?
23. 176 So. 2d at 399, relying upon State v. Hebert, 187 La. 318, 174 So. 369
(1937); and State v. Yana, 237 La. 186, 110 So.2d 573 (1959).
24. LA. R.S. 15:548 (1950).
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If it is a penalty for breaking jail pending the appeal, it would
appear to impose an unduly heavy sanction in cases where the
appeal is from a conviction and long sentence for a major felony.
In this regard it is significant that the Criminal Code provides
appropriate penalties for the separate crime of escape.25 State
v. Graves20 clearly shows that loss of the right of appeal was not
intended as a sanction for escaping from jail. In Graves, the
state moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the defend-
ant had escaped from jail and had committed another felony
while a fugitive from justice. The Supreme Court overruled
the motion to dismiss, stressing the fact that, while the defend-
ant was a fugitive when the state's motion was filed, he had
been returned to the parish jail and "was not a fugitive from
justice on the return day of his appeal or subsequently on the
day fixed for hearing his appeal. ' 27 It is interesting to note
that the defendant, although not represented by counsel, was
not present at the hearing and only the state's attorney appeared.
However, the defendant was not precluded from urging his ap-
peal by reason of having been a fugitive from justice. Assuming
that the defendant had been represented by an attorney on the
appeal, there seems little practical reason for the general rule
of article 548 that the appeal must be dismissed if the defendant
is a fugitive from justice. The common law rule, that in a felony
trial the defendant's presence is required at every important
step in the trial proceedings, is well established by the Louisiana
jurisprudence .2  Also, a number of specific rules, requiring pres-
ence of the defendant at various stages of the trial, are set out
in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2 However, it is well settled
that the defendant's presence is not required when motions are
made and determined by the court outside of the jury's pres-
ence,30 or where post-conviction motions are made and heard.3 1
There will be many instances where the defendant's appeal can
be heard and disposed of in his absence; and it appears illogical
to declare an automatic dismissal of the appeal, regardless of its
merits.
25. LA. R.S. 14:109 (aggravated escape) and 14:110 (simple escape) (1950).
26. 246 La. 460, 165 So. 2d 285 (1964).
27. Id. at 466, 165 So.2d at 287.
28. State v. Thomas, 128 La. 813, 55 So. 415 (1911); State v. Pope, 214
La. 1026, 39 So. 2d 719 (1949).
29. LA. R.S. 15:245, 15:257, 15:258, 15:265, 15:392, 15:396, 15:399 (1950).
30. State v. Fahey, 35 La. Ann. 9 (1883) (motion to quash the jury venire)
State v. Pierre, 39 La. Ann. 915, 3 So. 60 (1887).
31. State v. Wyatt, 50 La. Ann. 1301, 24 So. 335 (1898) (motion for appeal)
State v. Knox, 236 La. 461, 107 So. 2d 719 (1958).
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